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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 6(e)
United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 3133 (1983).
I. INTRODUCTION
In UnitedStates v. Sells Engineering, Inc.I the Supreme Court held that
attorneys in the Civil Division of the Justice Department may gain ac-
cess to grand jury materials for use in civil suits only if they obtain a
court order authorizing such access.2 The Court also held that courts
should grant such disclosure orders only when government attorneys es-
tablish a "particularized need" for the materials. 3 The Court based its
decision on the policy of grand jury secrecy, and on the legislative his-
tory of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), which governs the dis-
closure of grand jury materials.
4
This Note begins with a review of the policy of grand jury secrecy,
and a summary of the facts in Sells and of the Supreme Court's opinion.
The Note then analyzes the Court's decision, concluding that while the
policies underlying the rule of grand jury secrecy support the Court's
decision, the decision may be criticized because the Court ignored its
own well-established rules of statutory construction in its interpretation
of Rule 6(e). Further, the Note concludes that the majority undermines
the very goals the Supreme Court sought to achieve by its decision in
Sells when it held that courts should weigh certain factors in favor of
government attorneys when determining whether they have shown a
"particularized need" for the grand jury materials.5
1 103 S. Ct. 3133 (1983).
2 Id. at 3136.
3 Id.
4 103 S. Ct. at 3136-49. The complete text of FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) is reproduced infa
note 13.
5 103 S. Ct. at 3149.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. THE POLICY OF GRAND JURY SECRECY
The primary function of the grand jury is to investigate crimes and,
where the grand jury investigation produces evidence sufficient to war-
rant criminal prosecution, to indict persons suspected of committing
crimes.6 The secondary, though hardly unimportant, function of the
grand jury is to protect citizens against unfounded criminal
prosecutions.
7
One of the primary characteristics of the grand jury,8 and also the
6 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974); 1 C. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMI-
NAL PROCEDURE § 189, at 8 (12th ed. 1974).
The grand jury investigates crimes and makes accusations; it does not determine guilt.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 768 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6
governs the grand jury process. Rule 6(a) directs federal courts to summon one or more
grand juries "at such times as the public interest requires," and provides that the grand jury
consist of between 16 and 23 jurors. Rule 6(g) requires that the grand jury serve until dis-
charged by the court, but not longer than 18 months. Rule 6() provides that a grand jury
may indict a prospective defendant only if 12 or more jurors concur in the indictment.
In general, the grand jury has the power to investigate any crime over which the super-
vising court would have jurisdiction. The grand jury, however, cannot investigate the official
conduct of the executive branch of the government, but can inquire into the alleged commis-
sion of crimes in matters merely incidental to the conduct of government. A grand jury may
investigate a matter on its own volition, without being so charged by a court. I C. TORCIA,
supra, § 213, at 1.
7 Calandra, 414 U.S. at 343; 1 C. TORCIA, supra note 6, § 189, at 8. Because of its dual
function, the grand jury has been described as "both a sword and a shield." In re Grand Jury,
January, 1969, 315 F. Supp. 662, 671 (D.C. Md. 1970). The grand jury dates back to 12th
century Britain. Initially, its purpose was to investigate criminal behavior on behalf of the
Crown. By the late seventeenth century, however, its role as a shield against arbitrary and
oppressive governmental action became predominant. FRANKEL, THE GRAND JURY- AN
INSTITUTION ON TRIAL, 6-9 (1977); Note, Administrative Agency Access to GrandJu y Materials, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 162, 163-64 n. 13 (1975). The rule of grand jury secrecy evolved to guaran-
tee the grand jury's role as a shield against abuses by the Crown. Pickholz & Pickholz, Grand
Juiy Secrecy and the Administrative Agency: Balancing Effective Prosecution of White Collar Crime Against
Traditional Safeguards, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1027, 1029 (1979). In America's early colo-
nial days the grand jury's role as a "shield" against government abuses became predominant
as a result of resistance to British authoritarian rule. L. CLARK, THE GRAND JURY, 19
(1975). This led to the inclusion of a provision regarding the grand jury in the Bill of Rights,
ratified by the states in 1791. See U.S. CONsT. amend V.
8 The grand jury possesses three other major characteristics. First, the grand jury exists
to carry out the criminal law, not the civil law. See In re National Window Glass Cleaners,
287 F. Supp. 219 (N.D. Ohio 1922); 1 C. TORCIA, supra note 6, § 215, at 470. Second, the
grand jury possesses broad investigative powers extending far beyond normal discovery proce-
dures. 1 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL, Rule 6 § 101, at 197
(2d ed. 1982); see infra notes 93-103 and accompanying text.
Third, the grand jury theoretically acts independently of both the court and prosecutor.
United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 16 (1973); Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218
(1960); Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 712 n.54 (D.C. Cir. 1973); 1 C. WRIGHT, supra, § 101.
"[lts authority is derived from none of the three basic divisions of our government, but rather
directly from the people themselves," In re April 1956 Term Grand Jury, 239 F.2d 263, 269
(7th Cir. 1956). Thus, the grand jury is said to have the freedom to conduct its investigation
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focus of concern in Sells, is that its proceedings are kept secret. 9 Al-
though some commentators have argued that this policy of secrecy is
"an anachronism that has long outlived any real necessity,"10 the
Supreme Court considers it "indispensable,"' I and has stated that "the
proper functioning of our grand jury system depends upon the secrecy of
grand jury proceedings." 1 2 The decision in Sells turned on the interpre-
tation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), which codifies this
policy of grand jury secrecy.' 3 While Rule 6(e) provides that grand jury
"unhindered by external influence or supervision." In re Grand Jury, 446 F. Supp. 1132,
1135 (N.D. Tex. 1978). But see infra note 82 and accompanying text.
9 United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681 (1958); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 309 F.2d 440, 443 (3d Cir. 1962); In re May 1972 San Antonio Grand Jury, 366
F. Supp. 522, 533 (W.D. Tex. 1973); see also Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441
U.S. 211,218 n.9 (1979) ("Since the 17th century, grand jury proceedings have been closed to
the public, and records of such proceedings have been kept from the public eye. . . . The
rule of grand jury secrecy was imported into our federal common law and is an integral part
of our criminal justice system."); In re Petition for Disclosure of Evidence Before the October,
1959 Grand Jury of this Court, 184 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1960) ("Secrecy of grand jury
hearings has in history and in hornbook been a precept of criminal procedure. The nature
and virility of the grand jury, as a common law institution, could be seriously weakened if the
privileged privacy and security of its hearings were readily or freely withdrawn.").
10 Sherry, Grandjuy Minutes: The Unreasonable Rule of Secrecy, 48 VA. L. REv. 668, 684
(1962); see also Calkins, The Fading Myth ofGrandJug Sececy, I J. MAR. J. PRAc. & PROC. 18
(1967); Comment, Secrec in GrandJugy Proceedings: A Proposalfor a New Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 6(e), 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 307 (1969); Comment, GrandJugy Minutes and the Rule of
Secreq in Federal Litigation, 55 Nw. U. L. REV. 482 (1960); Note, A Reexamination of the Rule of
Secrecy of GrandJug Minutes in the Federal Courts, 34 N.Y.U. L. REV. 606 (1959).
tI United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 513 (1943).
12 Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 218. Traditionally, five reasons have been advanced for the
policy of grand jury secrecy:
(1) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be contemplated; (2) to insure
the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations, and to prevent persons subject
to indictment or their friends from importuning the grand jurors; (3) to prevent suborna-
tion of perjury or tampering with the witnesses who may testify before the grand jury
and later appear at the trial of those indicted by it; (4) to encourage free and untram-
meled disclosures by persons who have information with respect to the commission of
crimes; (5) to protect the innocent accused who is exonerated from disclosure of the fact
that he has been under investigation, and from the expense of standing trial where there
was no probability of guilt.
United States v. Amazon Industrial Chemical Corp., 55 F.2d 254, 261 (D. Md. 1931); see also
Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 219 n.10; Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. at 681-82 n.6; United States v.
Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-29 (3d Cir. 1954).
Justice Powell has provided the following reasons for the policy of secrecy:
First, if preindictment proceedings were made public, many prospective witnesses would
be hesitant to come forward voluntarily, knowing that those against whom they testify
would be aware of that testimony. Moreover, witnesses who appeared before the grand
jury would be less likely to testify fully and frankly, as they would be open to retribution
as well as to inducements. There also would be the risk that those about to be indicted
would flee, or would try to influence individual grand jurors to vote against indictment.
Finally, by preserving the secrecy of the proceedings, we assure that persons who are
accused but exonerated by the grand jury will not be held up to public ridicule.
Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 219.
13 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) provides:
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proceedings and materials are usually to be kept secret, it also carves out
certain, exceptions. 1
4
Under Rule 6(e) (3), parties may obtain access to grand jury materi-
als in two ways. The first method is known as "court-ordered disclo-
sure." Rule 6(e) (3) (C) (i) permits disclosure of grand jury materials
"when so directed by a court preliminarily to or in connection with a
judicial proceeding."' 5 Generally, parties seeking (C)(i) court-ordered
disclosure must demonstrate a "particularized need" for the grand jury
materials. 16
The second method by which parties may obtain disclosure of
grand jury materials is known as "automatic access." Rule 6(e) (3) (A)
(1) Recording of Proceedings.-All proceedings, except when the grand jury is de-
liberating or voting, shall be recorded stenographically or t) an electronic recording
device. An unintentional failure of any recording to reproduce all or any portion of a
proceeding shall not affect the validity of the prosecution. The recording or reporter's
notes or any transcript prepared therefrom shall remain in the custody or control of the
attorney for the government unless otherwise ordered by the court in a particular case.
(2) General Rule of Secrecy.-A grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an
operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney
for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph
(3)(A)(ii) of this subdivision shall not disclose matters occurring before the grand jury,
except as otherwise provided for in these rules. No obligation of secrecy may be imposed
on any person except in accordance with this rule. A knowing violation of Rule 6 may
be punished as a contempt of court.
(3) Exceptions.
(A) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before the
grand jury, other than its deliberations and the vote of any grand juror, may be made
to-
(i) an attorney for the government for use in the performance of such attorney's
duty; and
(ii) such government personnel as are deemed necessary by an attorney for the gov-
ernment to assist an attorney for the government in the performance of such attorney's
duty to enforce federal criminal law.
(B) Any person to whom matters are disclosed under subparagraph (A) (ii) of this
paragraph shall not utilize that grand jury material for any purpose other than assisting
the attorney for the government in the performance of such attorney's duty to enforce
criminal law. An attorney for the government shall promptly provide the district court,
before which was impaneled the grand jury whose material has been so disclosed, with
the names of the persons to whom such disclosure has been made.
(C) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before the
grand jury may also be made-
(i) when so directed by a court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial
proceeding; or
(ii) when permitted by a court at the request of the defendant, upon a showing that
grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters occurring
before the grand jury.
If the court orders disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury, the disclosure
shall be made in such manner, at such time, and under such conditions as the court may
direct.
14 See FED. R. GRIM. P. 6(e)(2), (3).
15 In addition, under Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(ii) defendants may also obtain court-ordered access
to grand jury materials "upon a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the
indictment because of matters occurring before the grand jury." That situation was not at
issue in Sells.
16 See infra notes 44, 115-29 and accompanying text.
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provides for automatic access in two very limited circumstances. First,
(A)(ii) grants automatic access to "such government personnel as are
deemed necessary by an attorney for the government to assist an attor-
ney for the government in the performance of such attorny's duty to enforce
federal criminal law." t 7 Second, (A)(i) permits automatic disclosure to
"an attorney for the government for use in the performance of such attor-
ne's duty."18 The essential issue in Sells was whether, under the latter
type of automatic access, "duty" includes enforcement of the civil law as
well as the criminal law.
B. THE FACTS IN SELLS.
After investigating charges against Sells Engineering, Inc. of crimi-
nal fraud on the United States Navy and evasion of federal income
taxes, a grand jury indicted Sells Engineering and two of its officers on
two counts of conspiracy to defraud the United States and nine counts
of tax fraud. 19 The individual respondents each pleaded guilty to one
count of conspiracy to defraud the government. The district court dis-
missed all other counts.
20
Thereafter, the government moved for disclosure of all grand jury
materials to attorneys in the Civil Division of the Justice Department for
use in a possible civil suit against respondents under the False Claims
Act.2 1 The district court granted the requested disclosure, over the re-
spondents' objections,22 concluding that Rule 6 (e) (3) (A) (i) entitles attor-
neys in the Civil Division to automatic access as a matter of right.23 The
Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that Civil Division attor-
neys could obtain access to grand jury proceedings and materials only
by seeking a (C)(i) court order and showing a "particularized need" for
17 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). "Attorney for the government," as
used in Rule 6, "means the Attorney General, an authorized assistant of the Attorney Gen-
eral, a United States Attorney, [or] an authorized assistant of a United States Attorney
.... " F. R. GRIM. P. 54(c).
18 FED. R. GRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(A)(i) (emphasis added).
19 103 S. Ct. at 3136. Sells Engineering had contracts with the United States Navy to
produce airborne electronic devices designed to interfere with enemy radar systems. Id.
20 Id. The opinion and order of the distict court are not reported.
21 Id. at 3137. Although the government asserted that a court order was unnecessary, it
requested permission for disclosure in the alternative. The government has always contended
that Civil Division attorneys are entitled to automatic access. Id. at 3137 n.4.
22 Respondents opposed the disclosure, alleging grand jury abuse. The district court
found it unnecessary to rule on this allegation, but stated summarily that had it considered
the issue it would have found no abuse. Id. at 3137 n.5. Abuse of the grand jury process is a
reason for denying disclosure of grand jury materials. See, e.g., United States v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Miller Brewing Co., 687
F.2d 1079, 1086 (7th Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, April, 1978, at Baltimore, 581
F.2d 1103, 1108 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 971 (1979).
23 103 S. Ct. at 3137; see supra text accompanying note 20.
1983] 1429
SUPREME CO UR T RE VIEW[l
the materials.2 4
C. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
I. The Majoriy Opinion
On appeal the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Ninth
Circuit, holding that Justice Department attorneys2 5 may not have
(A) (i) automatic access to grand jury materials for civil use, but rather
must seek a (C)(i) court order to obtain disclosure.2 6 The Court based
its decision on the policies underlying the rule of grand jury secrecy and
on the legislative history of Rule 6(e).
The majority first explained that (A) (i) automatic access should not
be permitted for civil use because it would cause three kinds of "mis-
chief." First, permitting automatic access for civil use would discourage
witnesses from coming forward and testifying fully and candidly before
the grand jury. The Court reasoned that if witnesses know that their
grand jury testimony will be routinely available to the government for
use in civil or administrative actions, the fear that such material may be
used against them in another forum will inhibit their willingness to tes-
tify.27 This is precisely what the rule of grand jury secrecy seeks to
avoid.
2 8
Second, the majority asserted that permitting automatic disclosure
for civil use would tempt prosecutors to manipulate the grand jury's
broad discovery powers2 9 in order to elicit evidence solely for use in civil
litigation.3 0 The Court reasoned that such a temptation would arise if
prosecutors knew their colleagues, without restriction, could use grand
jury materials in civil litigation. The majority emphasized that "use of
grand jury proceedings to elicit evidence for use in a civil case is im-
proper per se.'"3 1 In addition, the majority stressed that its concern
stemmed less from the belief that grand jury abuse occurs frequently
than from the fact that it is difficult to detect or prove such abuse when
it occurs.
3 2
24 In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 78-184, 642 F.2d 1184, 1191-92 (9th Cir. 1981).
25 The Court deemphasized the distinction between Civil Division and Criminal Division
attorneys, stressing that the critical distinction for Rule 6(e) purposes is the type of use-civil
or criminal. 103 S. Ct. at 3140.
26 Id. at 3140, 3147. Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion in which Justices White,
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined.
27 Id. at 3142.
28 See supra note 12 and accorpanying text.
29 See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
30 103 S. Ct. at 3142. The Court further suggested that prosecutors might start or con-
tinue a grand jury investigation even where criminal prosecution appears unlikely. Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.; see infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
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Third, the majority contended that a rule of automatic access for
civil use would subvert the limitations imposed outside the grand jury
context on the government's powers of discovery. The Court empha-
sized that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to Civil Division
attorneys, just as they do to other civil litigants. The Court noted that
because grand jury discovery powers are much greater than civil discov-
ery powers under the Federal Rules, 33 a rule of automatic access for civil
use would permit prosecutors to circumvent procedural limitations, lim-
itations imposed for sound reasons "ranging from fundamental fairness
to concern about burdensomeness and intrusiveness.
'34
The Court then turned to the legislative history of Rule 6(e). The
Court conceded that one plausibly could argue that the inclusion in
(A) (ii) of an express limitation to criminal matters, 35 and the absence of
that limitation in the otherwise similar language of (A) (i),36 suggest that
Congress did not intend to place a criminal use limitation on (A) (i) dis-
closure.3 7 The Court claimed, however, that "[t]he argument is not so
compelling, nor the language so plain . . . as to overcome the strong
arguments to the contrary drawn both from policy. . . and from legis-
lative history.
'3 8
The majority noted that the contents of (A)(i) had been part of
Rule 6(e) since the Rule was enacted in 1946, and that subparagraph
(A)(ii) was added to Rule 6(e) in 1977 to allow automatic access to
grand jury materials by nonattorneys assisting government attorneys.
3 9
The majority maintained that the fact that in 1977 Congress expressly
limited (A) (ii) to enforcement of the criminal law does not establish that
Congress never intended to place a criminal use restriction on (A) (i) au-
tomatic disclosure.40 According to the Court, Congress had merely
33 See infra notes 93-102 and accompanying text.
34 103 S. Ct. at 3143.
35 See supra text accompanying note 17.
36 See supra text accompanying note 18.
37 103 S. Ct. at 3144. This was the position taken by the dissent in Se//s. See infra notes 53-
57 and accompanying text.
38 Id. at 3144.
39 Id. From 1946 until 1977, Rule 6(e) contained no provision for access to grand jury
materials by nonattorneys assisting government attorneys. When Congress enacted the 1977
amendment, its concern focused on the increasing need of government attorneys to have the
technical assistance of nonattorneys and the resulting need to disclose grand jury materials to
those persons assisting government attorneys. Id. at 3144-45.
40 Id. at 3144. In reaching that conclusion, the Court relied on the legislative history of
(A)(ii). During the hearings on the 1977 amendment, Congressional criticism centered on
two concerns: disclosure of grand jury materials to government agencies other than the Jus-
tice Department and use of grand jury materials for non-grand jury purposes. According to
the Court, those two concerns were closely related, Congress' essential objection being to the
use of grand jury materials for civil purposes. Id. at 3145. The majority emphasized that
because the purpose of the 1977 amendment was to permit nonattorneys assisting government
1983] 1431
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made explicit in (A) (ii) what it believed to be already implicit in (A) (i)'s
language.4 1 In reaching the latter conclusion, the Court relied upon
three isolated statements found in the legislative history of the 1977
amendment. 42 The Court seemed to suggest that in 1977 Congress be-
lieved that (A)(i) already contained a criminal use restriction.
43
The majority then set forth the standard courts should apply in
determining whether to grant (C) (i) disclosure motions made by Justice
Department attorneys seeking grand jury materials for civil use. The
Court held that government attorneys, like private parties, must make a
strong showing of particularized need for the materials. 44 The Supreme
Court described that standard in detail in Douglas Oil v. Petrol Stops
Northwest45 and quoted it with favor in Sells: parties seeking court-or-
dered disclosure of grand jury materials "must show that the material
attorneys in criminal actions to have access to grand jury materials, see supra note 39, and
because the amendment in no way purported to alter the provision governing access by Jus-
tice Department attorneys, Congress paid little attention to the issue of whether Justice De-
partment attorneys might use grand jury materials for civil purposes. 103 S. Ct. at 3145-46.
41 Id. at 3144.
42 First, the Notes of the Advisog- Committee on Rules, 18 U.S.C.A. App. 26 (1976 ed. Supp.
VI), state that under the proposed amendment, disclosure to nonattorneys would be "subject
to the qualification that the matters disclosed be used onlyfor the purposes of the grandjury investi-
gation." Id. at 28 (emphasis added). The Court stressed that at that time the proposed draft
contained no express criminal use limitation, but only the double reference to "the perform-
ance of [government attorneys'] duties." From this the Court concluded that the Advisory
Committee meant that automatic access to grand jury materials was permitted for criminal
use only. 103 S. Ct. at 3145.
Second, the majority noted the statement of Acting Deputy Attorney General Richard
Thornburgh, testifying on behalf of the Justice Department at the House Hearings on the
proposed amendment: "It would be the practice of the Department at that time to seek a 6(e)
order from the court in order that the [grand jury] evidence could be made available for
whatever civil consequences might ensue." Id. at 3146.
Third, the majority quoted a statement in the Senate Report explaining the Senate's
redraft of Rule 6(e), then in substantially the form as the present Rule: "The Rule seeks to
allay the concerns of those who fear that such prosecutorial power will lead to misuse of the
grand jury to enforce non-criminal Federal laws by ...requiring that a court order under
paragraph (C) be obtained to authorize such a disclosure." Id at 3146-47.
43 See id. at 3144-47.
44 Id. at 3148. "Particularized need" is the standard courts usually apply in deciding
(C)(i) disclosure motions. Id.; see also Illinois v. Abbott & Associates, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 1356,
1361 (1983); Douglas Oil v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 217-24 (1979); Dennis v.
United States, 384 U.S. 855, 869-70 (1966); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360
U.S. 395, 398-401 (1959); United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681-83
(1958). In Sells, the government had contended that if the Court held that (A)(i) prohibited
automatic disclosure for civil use, the government should have to demonstrate only that the
materials sought are relevant to matters within the scope of the government attorneys' duties
in order to obtain a (C)(i) disclosure order. Brief for the United States at 13, United States v.
Sells Engineering, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 3133 (1983). The government asserted that the less restric-
tive "rational relationship" test, rather than the "particularized need" test, should be applied
because government attorneys enforcing the civil law are serving the public interest. Id. at 43;
cf. infa notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
45 441 U.S. 211, 222-23 (1979).
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they seek is needed to avoid a possible injustice in another judicial pro-
ceeding, that the need for disclosure is greater than the need for contin-
ued secrecy, and that their request is structured to cover only material so
needed .... "46
While the majority in Sells held that the same standard applies to
the government as applies to private parties, it went on to emphasize
that the particularized need standard is a flexible test. The standard is
flexible in that the greater the need for secrecy, the greater the particu-
larized need a party must demonstrate in order to obtain disclosure; the
less the need for secrecy, the less particularized need a party must
demonstrate.4 7 The Court asserted that when government attorneys
seek disclosure, the need for secrecy may not be as great as when private
parties seek disclosure. This is because: (1) "disclosure to Justice De-
partment attorneys poses less risk of further leakage or improper use [of
grand jury materials] than would disclosure to private parties;" (2) the
Justice Department's usual policy is to seek grand jury materials for civil
use only after the criminal phase of the matter has closed; and (3) disclo-
sure of grand jury materials to the government, even for civil use, serves
the public interest. 48 The Court thus suggested that government attor-
neys seeking (C) (i) disclosure orders need not show as great a need for
the materials as private parties may have to show.
2. The Dissenting Opinion
In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger 49 maintained that the majority's
decision conflicted with the plain language of (A) (i).-9 According to the
Chief Justice, the language of (A) (i) is clear, and nothing in that subpar-
agraph remotely suggests that the only "duty" contemplated by (A) (i) is
the prosecution of criminal cases.5 1 Chief Justice Burger contended that
that should have ended the matter.
Chief Justice Burger then asserted that the majority's holding also
conflicted with the legislative history of Rule 6(e). He claimed that the
46 103 S. Ct. at 3148.
47 As the Court explained in Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 223,
[D]isclosure is appropriate only in those cases where the need for it outweighs the public
interest in secrecy, and . .. the burden of demonstrating this balance rests upon the
private party seeking disclosure. It is . . .clear that as the considerations justifying se-
crecy become less relevant, a party asserting a need for grand jury transcripts will have a
lesser burden in showing justification. . . . In sum,. . . the court's duty in a case of this
kind is to weigh carefully the competing interests in light of the relevant circumstances
and the standards announced by this Court. And if disclosure is ordered, the court may
include protective limitations on the use of the disclosed material . ...
48 103 S. Ct. at 3149.
49 Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor joined the dissent.




legislative history clearly supported the plain language of the Rule. 52
Chief Justice Burger focused on two particular aspects of the legislative
history. First, he pointed out that the drafters of (A) (i) heard numerous
arguments for and against granting automatic access to Justice Depart-
ment attorneys, and thus "were fully aware of the breadth of the rule"
they adopted.53 According to the Chief Justice, the drafters would have
changed the wording of (A) (i) had they intended the rule to have the
restrictive meaning advanced by the majority. 54 Second, Chief Justice
Burger noted that when Congress added (A) (ii) in 1977, it did so against
a history of more than thirty years of consistent Justice Department
practice of obtaining grand jury materials for civil use without court
order.55 Indeed, according to the dissent, on several occasions courts
have held that civil attorneys for the Department of Justice could have
automatic access to grand jury materials. 56 Thus, Chief Justice Burger
concluded that had Congress intended to limit (A) (i) to criminal mat-
ters, it would have done so expressly in 1977.
5 7
Chief Justice Burger then argued that the Court "erred gravely in
its assessment of the policy implications. 58  He claimed that the secrecy
concerns on which the majority relied have little relevance given that
normal Justice Department practice calls for disclosing grand jury
materials for civil use only after the grand jury proceeding and criminal
action have concluded.59 Chief Justice Burger asserted that in such a
situation there is "no risk that potential defendants may flee or try to
influence grand jurors or witnesses." 6 He further claimed that Justice
Department attorneys are officers of the court bound to high ethical
standards and are less likely to violate grand jury secrecy than are non-
attorneys and private parties.
6 1
52 Id. at 3151-52.
53 Id. at 3153-54.
54 Id. at 3154.
55 Id. at 3154-56.
56 Id. at 3156 (citing United States v. General Electronic Co., 209 F. Supp. 197, 198-202
(E.D.Pa. 1962)); see also United States v. Wohl Shoe Co., 369 F. Supp. 386 (D.N.M. 1974); In
re July 1973 Grand Jury, 374 F. Supp. 1334, 1337 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Washington v. American
Pipe and Constr. Co., 41 F.R.D. 59, 62 (W.D. Wash., D. Or., D. Hawaii, N.D. Cal., S.D. Cal.
1966).
57 103 S. Ct. at 3156-59 (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
58 Id. at 3159. Burger also maintained that the language and history of Rule 6(e) are so
clear that the Court should not have resorted to policy considerations. Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. However, Chief Justice Burger did not respond to the one policy of the traditional
five underlying the rule of secrecy, see .rupra note 12 and accompanying text, that most con-
cerned the majority-encouraging witnesses to come forward and testify fully and candidly
before the grand jury. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
61 103 S. Ct. at 3159-60. Burger also maintained that the mere potential for abuse of the
grand jury process does not justify the majority's adoption of a blanket rule against granting
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Finally, Chief Justice Burger contended that permitting govern-
ment attorneys to have automatic access to grand jury materials for civil
as well as criminal use would serve the public interest in two ways.
62
First, granting government attorneys automatic access, rather than
"relegat[ing them]. . to the civil discovery provisions," would save the
government considerable time and expense. 63 Second, in many cases a
rule of automatic access would enable the government to "enforce im-
portant laws in meritorious civil actions" 64 that it would otherwise be
unable to enforce.65 The dissent emphasized that enforcement of the
civil law frequently serves the public interest as much as does enforce-
ment of the criminal law.
66
The Chief Justice concluded by criticizing the majority for provid-
ing little guidance to the lower courts and the Justice Department re-




The decision in Sells certainly is supported by policy considerations.
The Court quite correctly found that automatic disclosure for civil use
would cause three kinds of problems.
1. The Discouragement of Candid GrandJug Testimony
The majority in Sells feared that granting government attorneys
automatic access to grand jury materials for civil use would discourage
witnesses from coming forward and testifying fully and candidly before
the grand jury.6 Despite Chief Justice Burger's contention, 69 that con-
cern presents a compelling case for preserving grand jury secrecy, even
after the grand jury investigation has terminated and an indictment has
been returned.70 Courts must consider not only the immediate effects
government attorneys automatic access to grand jury materials for civil use, but only justifies
imposing sanctions in actual cases of abuse. Id. at 3160.
62 Id. at 3161.
63 Id. Chief Justice Burger claimed that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
designed with private litigants in mind, and that Justice Department attorneys were subject
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure solely for lack of a better alternative. Id.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 3162-63.
66 Id. at 3162.
67 Id. at 3163. In particular, Chief Justice Burger noted that the majority remained silent
on the issue of whether a particular Justice Department attorney who participated in a crimi-
nal investigation could subsequently use the grand jury materials in civil litigation. The ma-
jority expressly declined to resolve this issue. Id.
68 See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
69 See supra text accompanying notes 58-60.
70 1 C. WRIGHT, supra note 8, § 106, at 244-46. Uninhibited testimony by grand jury
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that disclosure may have upon witnesses testifying before a particular
grand jury, but also the latent effects it may have upon the willingness
of witnesses to testify before future grand juries.
7 1
There are at least three reasons why grand jury witnesses will be
reluctant to testify candidly if the government has access to grand jury
proceedings and materials for civil use. First, and perhaps most impor-
tant, if a grand jury investigation turns up civilly incriminating evidence
against witnesses, those witnesses could be prosecuted in a subsequent
civil action.72 The last two reasons stem from the fact that the greater
the access to grand jury materials, the greater the likelihood that they
will fall into the hands of outside parties. 73 Thus, grand jury witnesses
may fear that the person under investigation will seek retribution
against them. 74 Furthermore, if it becomes publicly known that an indi-
vidual has been associated with a grand jury inquiry, that individual
could be socially stigmatized.
75
2. The Temptation to Manipulate the GrandJuiy to Elicit Evidence
for Civil Use
The second policy issue that concerned the majority in Sells was
that permitting (A) (i) automatic access for civil use would lead prosecu-
tors to manipulate the grand jury's broad discovery powers to obtain
evidence intended solely for civil use. 76 The Supreme Court has stated
witnesses is essential to the proper functioning of the grand jury, the task of which is to inves-
tigate crimes and return indictments, and to protect the innocent from unfounded prosecu-
tion by the government. See United States v. Scott Paper Co., 254 F. Supp. 759, 761 (W.D.
Mich. 1966) (The need to encourage free disclosure by those having information about crimes
is a "reason for secrecy which can be ignored by no court. It is a reason of paramount impor-
tance."); see also United States v. Sobotka, 623 F.2d 764, 767 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v.
Moten, 582 F.2d 654, 663 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Mohoney, 495 F. Supp. 1270, 1272
(E.D. Pa. 1980);In re William H. Pflaumer & Sons, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 464, 470 (E.D. Pa. 1971);
Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 486, 490 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
71 Douglas Oil v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 221-24 (1979).
72 This was suggested by the Supreme Court in Sells. 103 S. Ct. at 3142; see supra text
accompanying note 27. This threat to grand jury witnesses is exacerbated by the fact that
grand jury witnesses may not have a right to receive fifth amendment warnings. See infra note
100 and accompanying text.
73 The Supreme Court appeared to suggest this in Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 222.
74 Id. The defendant is not present during the grand jury investigation other than when
he himself is giving testimony. See 38 AM. JUR. 2D GrandJuy § 34 (1968).
75 Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 222.
76 See supra text accompanying notes 29-32. Indeed, it has frequently been stated that
permitting easy access under Rule 6(e) would encourage this. In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
Miller Brewing Co., 687 F.2d 1079, 1091-92 (7th Cir. 1982); In re Special February, 1975
Grand Jury (Baggot), 662 F.2d 1232, 1237 (7th Cir. 1981), ajj'd, 103 S. Ct. 3164 (1983); In re
Grand Jury Investigation No. 78-184 (Sells), 642 F.2d 1184, 1190 (9th Cir. 1981); see also
Note, Administrative Agency Access to GrandJu y Material Under Amended Rule 6(e), 29 CASE W.
RES. 295, 320 (1978); Note, Administrative Agency Access to Grandjug Materials, 75 COLUM. L.
REv. 162, 166-67 (1975).
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that if a prosecutor were to use the grand jury process to marshall evi-
dence for use in a civil case, the prosecutor "would be flouting the policy
of the law."' 77 That is not to say that grand jury materials may never be
disclosed for use in civil cases. 78 Subparagraph (C) (i), which authorizes
courts to order disclosure of grand jury materials, contains no criminal
use limitation. 79 Nevertheless, as the grand jury possesses extraordinary
discovery powers precisely because it is a criminal proceeding that does
not determine guilt, but only investigates and accuses, 80 "the use of
these powers ought to be limited as far as reasonably possible to the
accomplishment of the task."8'
The potential for abuse of the grand jury is much greater today
than when the grand jury was incorporated into the Bill of Rights or
when Congress adopted Rule 6(e) in 1946. This is because "the govern-
ment prosecutor has gained substantial influence over the grand jury,
and subsequently that institution has lost much of its former indepen-
dence."'82 The prosecutor, originally restricted from the presence of the
grand jury, now literally conducts the inquest. 83 Normally, it is the
United States Attorney who brings matters to the attention of the grand
jury and initiates the investigation.8 4 The United States Attorney causes
subpoenas to be issued for witnesses and records.85 In addition to deter-
mining what witnesses to call before the grand jury, it is the prosecutor
who examines those witnesses.8 6 The prosecutor also provides a great
deal of technical assistance to the grand jury. The prosecutor gathers
the evidence, presents it to the grand jury, explains the law, sums up the
77 United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958); see Miller Brewing Co.,
687 F.2d at 1086.
78 See Miller Brewing Co., 687 F.2d at 1087.
79 See supra note 13.
80 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
81 Sells, 103 S. Ct. at 3143 (citing United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 45-46 (1973) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting)).
82 United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781, 785 (9th Cir. 1974). Although the grand jury is
theoretically independent of the executive branch of government, see supra note 8 and accom-
panying text, this no longer appears to be true. As the California Supreme Court has pointed
out, "'It is, indeed, common knowledge that the grand jury, having been conceived as a
bulwark between the citizen and the Government, is now a tool of the Executive.'" Hawkins
v. Superior Court of San Francisco, 22 Cal. 3d 584, 590-91, 586 P.2d 916, 920, 150 Cal. Rptr.
435, 439 (1978) (quoting United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 23 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting)).
83 See Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v. Director of Internal Revenue, 406 F. Supp. 1098, 1119
(E.D. Pa. 1976).
84 1 L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES § 6:82, at 449
(1966); Note, The GrandJuy as an Investigative Body, 74 HARV. L. REV. 590, 596 (1961).
85 1 L. ORFIELD, supra note 84, § 6:82, at 449.
86 United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1312 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825
(1977); In re Lopreato, 511 F.2d 1150, 1153 (1st Cir. 1975).
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evidence, and requests the indictment.8 7 The extraordinary control that
prosecutors have over the grand jury vastly increases their ability to use
the grand jury to marshall evidence solely for civil use.
Not only is the potential for grand jury abuse greater today, but a
growing number of lower court decisions graphically demonstrate that
such abuse is likely to occur.8 8 Furthermore, the very fact that grand
jury abuse is difficult to detect8 9 and that claims of grand jury abuse
87 United States v. Kleen Laundry & Cleaners, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 519, 522 (E.D.N.Y.
1974); 1 L. ORFIELD,tupra note 84, § 6:74, at 441; see Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth Annual
Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit, 67 F.R.D. 513, 538 (1975). As one
author has noted, "In practice. . . the district attorney, because of his access to information,
prestige as an important government official, and familiarity with grand jury procedure,
tends to direct the grand jury's operations." Note, supra note 84, at 596. Compare the prose-
cutor's central role in the grand jury process, discussed supra notes 83-86 and accompanying
text, with the minimal role of the prospective defendant. Individuals under grand jury inves-
tigation are protected by fewer procedural guarantees than are defendants in civil or criminal
actions. For example, individuals under grand jury investigation have no right to notice of
the charges against them, to testify on their own behalf, to counsel before the grand jury, or to
cross-examine witnesses and introduce rebuttal evidence. United States v. Scully, 225 F. 2d
113, 116 (2d Cir. 1955); In re Black, 47 F.2d 542, 543-44 (2d Cir. 1931); 1 L. ORFIELD, supra
note 84, § 6:75, at 442; see also supra note 8 and accompanying text.
88 Most of the cases of grand jury abuse involve abuse by attorneys for federal agencies as
opposed to prosecutors. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas April, 1978, at Baltimore, 581 F.2d
1103 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 971 (1979); In re April 1956 Term Grand Jury, 239
F.2d 263 (7th Cir. 1956); Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v. Director of Internal Revenue, 406 F.
Supp. 1098 (E.D. Pa. 1976); United States v. Doe, 341 F. Supp. 1350, 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1972);
Sam Cohen, 43 T.C.M. 312 (1981). Nevertheless, the cases are relevant here because they
involve abuse by agency attorneys made possible by their role as technical assistants to the
grand jury, the same role the prosecutor plays. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 23
(1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962). The reason there
are few cases of prosecutorial abuse may stem from the fact that grand jury abuse is difficult
to detect and that claims of grand jury abuse usually fail. See infra notes 89-90 and accompa-
nying text.
Sells may itself provide an example of grand jury abuse by prosecutors. In their brief to
the Supreme Court, the respondents claimed that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) initi-
ated a grand jury investigation when its own administrative investigation became judicially
stymied. Brief of Respondents at 26, United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 3133
(1983). The same IRS agents that conducted the administrative investigation conducted the
grand jury investigation. Id. Further, the respondents alleged that the IRS, with the assist-
ance of the United States Attorney's office, abused the grand jury subpoena power to induce
witnesses to waive their fifth amendment rights, and to intimidate witnesses into appearing
before IRS agents "voluntarily" to be interrogated under oath. Id. In addition, the respon-
dents claimed that the IRS induced the U.S. Attorney to require, as a condition of the plea
bargain, that the respondents sign a detailed admission of tax liability, prepared from grand
jury materials 18 months before the IRS sought a (C)(i) disclosure order. Id. The respon-
dents emphasized the role of the U.S. Attorney in this agency abuse. Id.
The district court in Sells never resolved the issue of grand jury abuse, but only stated
summarily that had it decided the issue it would have found no such abuse. 103 S. Ct. at
3137 n.5. Both the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court held that the district court should
have considered seriously the defendants' allegations of grand jury abuse, and remanded for
such consideration. 642 F.2d at 1192; 103 S. Ct. at 3149 n.36.
89 Grand jury abuse is difficult to detect for at least three reasons. First, it is often difficult
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usually fail9 may make prosecutors more willing to take the risk in-
volved in engaging in such abuse.9 1
3. The Subversion of Congressionally Imposed Limits on
Civil Discovey Powers
The third kind of "mischief" that concerned the majority in Sells
was that allowing (A) (i) automatic access for civil use would, in effect,
also allow the government to use the extraordinary subpoena power of
the grand jury to subvert the procedural limits on civil discovery.
92
The grand jury possesses discovery powers extending far beyond
those available to civil litigants under the established rules of discovery
and procedure.93 The grand jury is relatively unrestricted in its power
to compel the production of evidence or the testimony of witnesses that
to ascertain whether a grand jury investigation occurred, as grand jury proceedings are gener-
ally kept secret. Second, it is frequently difficult to ascertain whether evidence used against a
defendant in a civil proceeding was initially obtained from grand jury materials, since ille-
gally obtained grand jury materials might have led to other legitimate evidence on the same
subject. Third, it may be difficult to ascertain whether the government obtained such materi-
als pursuant to a (C)(i) court order, as such orders are usually granted exparlc. See Brown,
GrandJui Secreq, Violations, BARRISTER, Fall 1981, at 31, 32.
90 1 C. WRIGHT, supra note 8, § I11.1, at 320. Claims of grand jury abuse usually fail for
two reasons. First, there is a strong presumption favoring the regularity of grand jury pro-
ceedings. Id. at 326. Second, the party claiming that the grand jury process was abused bears
a heavy burden even to obtain a hearing on the charges. In re Special April 1977 Grand Jury,
587 F.2d 889, 892 (7th Cir. 1978); In re Hunter, 520 F. Supp. 1020, 1022 (W.D. Mo. 1981);
United States v. Shober, 489 F. Supp. 393, 409 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
91 These factors also weigh against the dissent's suggestion in Sells that the threat of grand
jury abuse does not justify a blanket rule prohibiting automatic disclosure to the government
for civil use, but rather that incidents of abuse can be handled on a case-by-case basis. See
supra note 61.
92 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
93 1 C. WRIGHT, supra note 8, § 101, at 197. The grand jury is accorded such broad
discovery powers because it only determines whether criminal proceedings should be insti-
tuted and does not adjudicate guilt. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972); United
States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 622 (2d Cir. 1979). Justice Powell stated in United States
v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343-44 (1973) (citations omitted):
Traditionally the grand jury has been accorded wide latitude to inquire into violations of
criminal law. No judge presides to monitor its proceedings. It deliberates in secret and
may determine alone the course of its inquiry. The grand jury may compel the produc-
tion of evidence or the testimony of witnesses as it considers appropriate, and its opera-
tion generally is unrestrained by the technical procedural and evidentiary rules
governing the conduct of criminal trials ...
The scope of the grand jury's powers reflects its special role in insuring fair and
effective law enforcement. A grand jury proceeding is not an adversary hearing in which
the guilt or innocence of the accused is adjudicated. Rather, it is an cxpart investigation
to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether criminal proceedings
should be instituted against any person. The grand jury's investigative power must be
broad if its public responsibility is adequately to be discharged.
See also Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919); United States v. Doulin, 538 F.2d
466, 469 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 895 (1976); Schwartz v. United States Dept. of Justice,
494 F. Supp. 1268, 1276 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
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it deems appropriate. 94 "[I]ts operation generally is unrestrained by the
technical procedural and evidentiary rules governing the conduct of
criminal trials." 95 Thus, for example, while witnesses in civil suits have
the right to refuse to answer irrelevant questions, that right is severely
restricted in the grand jury context.
96
Further, the grand jury's discovery powers extend not only beyond
normal procedural limitations, but also beyond certain normal constitu-
tional limitations. Thus, although a grand jury cannot require a witness
to produce or testify to matters protected by privilege, 97 constitutional
privileges may apply differently in the grand jury context than in other
judicial proceedings. For example, the first amendment does not protect
journalists from appearing before grand juries or from answering "rele-
vant and material questions asked during a good-faith grand jury inves-
tigation."98 Moreover, illegally obtained evidence may be presented to
the grand jury.99 Finally, while the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination applies to grand jury proceedings, the Supreme Court
has not decided whether grand jury witnesses must receive fifth amend-
ment warnings. I° °
In all these respects, then, the grand jury has access to a vast
amount of information to which civil litigants do not have access under
normal procedural and constitutional limitations on discovery. Thus, if
the government could gain access to grand jury materials for use in civil
cases, it would have a great advantage over its civil opponent.10 1 As the
94 Calandra, 414 U.S. at 343. While the evidence and testimony sought must be relevant
to the investigation, "the relevancy of the questions proposed to bring out the evidence need
not be conclusively established. It is enough that there is a 'justifiable suspicion' that the
questions are related to the subject of the investigation." 83 AM. JUR. 2D GrandJug § 37
(1968).
95 Calandra, 414 U.S. at 343. The Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to proceedings
before a grand jury. 1 C. WRIGHT, supra note 8, § 104, at 220-2 1; Note, Recent Developments in
the Law of the Federal GrandJuy, 1977 UTAH L. REv. 170, 213.
96 Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059, 1076 (9th Cir. 1972).
97 1 C. WRIGHT, supra note 8, § 104, at 222.
98 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 708; 1 C. WRIGHT, supra note 8, § 104, at 222-23.
99 See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 354-55; In re Weir, 495 F.2d 879, 880-81 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1038 (1974); 1 C. WRIGHT, supra note 8, § 104, at 224-25.
100 United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 186 (1977); 1 C. WRIGHT, supra note 8,
§ 104, at 227-28.
101 Of course, the civil opponent could gain access to grand jury materials by seeking a
(C) (i) court order and demonstrating "particularized need" for the disclosure. See supra notes
15-16 and accompanying text. Under the particularized need standard, however, courts gen-
erally order disclosure of grand jury materials only for such purposes as impeaching a witness,
testing the credibility of a witness, refreshing a witness's memory, and the like. 1 C. WRIGHT,
supra note 8, § 109, at 283-84; see Douglas Oil v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 222 n.
12 (1979); United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958). A rule of auto-
matic access, however, would permit the government to use grand jury materials for such
purposes as discovering violations of the civil law, framing complaints, and preparing for trial
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federal rules of procedure and discovery apply to the government as well
as to private parties,10 2 permitting (A) (i) automatic access for civil use
would indeed subvert the traditional limits on procedure and discovery.
B. LEGISLATIVE INTENT REGARDING RULE 6(e)
While policy considerations support the majority's decision, the de-
cision may be criticized because the Court ignored its own well-estab-
lished rules of statutory construction in its interpretation of Rule 6(e).
Not only did the majority fail to make any reference to these rules, but
its statutory analysis in no way comports with these rules. Indeed, the
dissent's analysis comports far better than the majority's with the rules
of statutory construction.
The Supreme Court has held that courts should interpret federal
statutes under the established rules of statutory construction.10 3 The
foremost rule of construction requires courts to give effect to Congress's
intent in enacting a given statute. 10 4 In determining legislative intent,
courts must look first to the language of the statute.10 5 This is known as
the plain meaning rule. On its face, the language of Rule 6(e) (3) (A) (i)
appears quite clear. It grants government attorneys automatic access to
grand jury materials "for use in the performance of such attorney's
duty." The language contains no criminal use limitation, as read into
the statute by the Court in Sells.
However, the meaning apparent on the face of the statute need not
in general. On the other hand, defendants involved in the same litigation would not have
access to those same materials unless they were able to show a particularized need.
102 As one commentator has suggested,
[A] reading of the Federal Rules [of Civil Procedure] as a whole indicates that they were
meant generally to apply to the Government as well as any other party to a civil action.
Rule 12 specifically extends the time within which the United States may plead to sixty
days. Rule 4 makes an exception of the United States in the procedure of service of
process on the United States. And most imperative is Rule 81 wherein all the exceptions
to the Rules are cited: and nowhere in Rule 81 is the United States exempt from the
general application of the Rules.
Note, Federal Procedure-Applicability of Discovery Procedure under Federal Rules to the United States,
27 MARQ. L. REV. 158, 158 (1943);see also Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. at 681; United States v.
Nat'l City Bank of New York, 83 F.2d 236, 238 (2d Cir. 1936); Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co.,
26 F. Supp. 583, 584 (E.D.N.Y. 1939).
103 Bardes v. Hawarden Bank, 178 U.S. 524 (1900); 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 144 (1974).
104 United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 606 (1941); United States v. American
Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940).
105 Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 336 (1981); see also United States v. N.E.
Rosenblum Truck Lines, 315 U.S. 50, 53 (1942). This rule stems from the fact that Congress
votes only on the language of a statute. In reality, the members of Congress may each intend
many different results by voting to adopt that language. See generaly Banco Mexicano de
Commercio e Industria v. Deutsche Banke, 263 U.S. 591, 602 (1924); Omaha & C. B. Street
Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 230 U.S. 324, 333-34 (1913); Aldridge v. Wil-
liams, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 9, 24 (1845); 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 196 (1974).
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end a court's inquiry into legislative intent. 106 The circumstances of the
enactment of a statute may persuade a court that Congress did not in-
tend words of common meaning to have their literal effect.'0 7 Indeed,
the Supreme Court has declared that courts may resort to explanatory
legislative history, regardless of how clear the words of a statute may
appear on superficial examination.
0 8
Another rule of statutory construction bears significantly on the in-
terpretation of Rule 6(e). Where the courts and other parties have
placed a particular construction on the language of a statute for a long
time, Congress's failure to express disapproval amounts to legislative
sanction of that construction. 10 9 This rule applies particularly where
Congress amends the statute in other respects." 0
This rule of construction to subparagraph (A)(i) suggests that the
dissent's position in Sells is far more tenable than the majority's. The
majority ignored the construction that the courts and the Justice De-
partment had for years given to (A) (i). The dissent, on the other hand,
noted that when Congress added (A) (ii) in 1977, it did so against a back-
drop of more than thirty years of consistent Justice Department practice
of using grand jury materials without court order in civil suits, and
against a backdrop of courts consistently upholding this practice. Thus
it appears, as the dissent maintained, that Congress understood in 1977
that under (A) (i) all Justice Department attorneys were authorized to
use grand jury materials in the full range of their duties-including civil
matters-and chose to leave that standard unchanged."'
Because there is some support in the legislative history for the
Court's interpretation of Rule 6(e), 1 12 the Court cannot be accused of
revising the statute and acting as a superlegislature. 13 Nonetheless, the
106 Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 (1981).
107 Id.; American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. at 543.
108 Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476, 479 (1943); 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 150
(1974).
109 Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 397-404 (1943); Great Northern Ry. Co. v. United
States, 315 U.S. 262, 275-76 (1942); Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288
U.S. 294, 324-25 (1933); 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes §§ 161-62, 164 (1974). The Supreme Court
has held that great weight should be given to the longstanding construction of a statute by the
agency charged with administering it. NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67, 74-75 (1973); Fed-
eral Maritime Comm. v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 745 (1973).
110 Missouri v. Ross, 299 U.S. 72 (1936). This is because a presumption exists that at the
time Congress adopts (or, as in Sells, modifies) a particular statute, it had knowledge of the
historical circumstances related to the act's subject matter.
I11 Sells, 103 S. Ct. at 3159 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
112 See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
113 Under the doctrine of separation of powers, courts have no legislative authority. See
Ebert v. Poston, 266 U.S. 548, 554 (1925); Braffith v. Virgin Islands, 26 F.2d 646, 648 (3d Cir.
1928). Regardless of a court's opinion of the wisdom of a statute, the court's duty is to apply
the statute as found, and not to revise it. Board of Education v. Public School Employees'
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Court can be criticized for having ignored its own well-established rules
of statutory construction because it is reasonable to assume that legisla-
tures rely on these rules when they write statutes. 114 For the Court to
change the rules after the "game" has begun is indeed cause for
criticism.
C. "PARTICULARIZED NEED" TEST
The majority in Sells emphasized that the particularized need test is
a flexible standard under which the need for disclosure must be bal-
anced against the public interest in secrecy.' 15 Thus, the less the need
for secrecy, the less particularized need a party has to show to obtain a
(C) (i) disclosure order."16 The majority asserted that when government
attorneys seek access to grand jury materials, three factors decrease the
need for secrecy. 117 The majority's emphasis on those three factors,
however, is inappropriate.
First, the majority asserted that disclosure to Justice Department
attorneys poses less risk of further breach of secrecy or abuse of the
grand jury than would disclosure to private parties.' 18 There is no rea-
son to assume, however, that disclosure to government attorneys poses
less risk. Clearly, abus6 of the grand jury by government prosecutors to
marshall evidence solely for civil use is likely to occur.'1 9 Indeed, while
prosecutors have ample opportunity to abuse grand jury proceedings to
elicit evidence for civil suits, private parties have no opportunity to
abuse the grand jury as they have no right to even appear before the
grand jury. 120 Further, the Court stressed that one of the policies behind
the rule of grand jury secrecy is to ensure that witnesses come forward
Union, 233 Minn. 144, 152, 45 N.W.2d 797, 802 (195 1); see Matson Navigation Co. v. United
States, 284 U.S. 352, 356 (1932); 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 197 (1974). The theory of separa-
tion of powers is not expressly announced in the United States Constitution. The doctrine
arises, however, from the fact that the Constitution creates three departments of government,
vesting the legislative power in one, the executive power in another, and the judicial power in
a third. S. DODD, STATE GOVERNMENT 58 (2d ed. 1928).
114 This conclusion may be drawn from an analogous presumption. Thus, the legislature is
presumed to know the meaning of words, and to have used the words of a statute advisedly.
In re Opinion ofJustices, 303 Mass. 631, 638, 22 N.E.2d 49, 55 (1939); State v. Ross, 272 N.C.
67, 71, 157 S.E.2d 712, 715 (1967); Gord v. Salt Lake City, 20 Utah 2d 138, 140, 434 P.2d 449,
451 (1967). Further support for this conclusion stems from the fact that statutes are consid-
ered to have been enacted with a view toward their interpretation under the settled principles
of statutory interpretation. 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 142 (1974).
115 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
116 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
117 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
118 See id.
119 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
120 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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and testify fully and candidly before the grand jury. 12 1 Disclosure to
government attorneys, however, may inhibit grand jury witnesses as
much as does disclosure to private parties, since disclosure to govern-
ment attorneys may lead to the filing of a civil suit against them.
22
Thus, the knowledge that supposedly secret grand jury testimony may
be released to the government in the future may lead grand jury wit-
nesses to testify less candidly and completely than they would otherwise.
The second factor the Court said should be weighed in favor of
government attorneys when applying the particularized need test is the
fact that it is the usual policy of the Justice Department not to seek civil
uses of grand jury materials until the criminal phase of a matter has
closed. 123 That fact, however, does not render grand jury secrecy con-
cerns irrelevant because lifting the veil of grand jury secrecy affects the
willingness of witnesses to testify before grand juries in the future, even if
grand jury materials are not disclosed until the close of a criminal case.
The third factor that the majority believed courts should weigh in
favor of government attorneys is that enforcement of the civil law serves
the public interest. 124 While the majority did not state what it meant by
"the public interest," the dissent in Sells enumerated two public interests
served by granting Justice Department attorneys automatic access to
grand jury materials for civil use: saving time and money by not having
to observe normal discovery procedures, and prosecuting civil actions
that would otherwise fail for lack of evidence.'
25
As to the first interest, considerations of time and money must yield
to the primary concern of ensuring a fair and impartial trial. 126 As to
the second interest asserted by the dissent, one cannot deny that enforc-
ing the civil law serves the public interest. However, Congress appears
to have determined that for reasons of fairness and concern about intru-
sions on personal privacy, civil discovery should be limited, 27 even
though that means actions may fail for lack of evidence. It thus seems
that Congress has determined that interests of fairness and privacy may
outweigh society's interest in enforcing the civil law.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the policies underlying the rule of grand jury secrecy pro-
vide strong support for the Supreme Court's decision in Sells, the deci-
121 See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
122 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
123 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
124 See id.
125 See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
126 Moss v. Associated Transport, Inc., 344 F.2d 23, 26 (6th Cir. 1965).
127 Sells, 103 S. Ct. at 3143.
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sion may be criticized because the Court ignored its own well-
established rules of statutory construction in its interpretation of Rule
6(e). Further, the Court undermined the very goals it sought to advance
by holding that when government attorneys seek access to grand jury
materials, the need for secrecy is not as strong as when other parties seek
access, and that therefore the government does not have to show as
much particularized need for the grand jury materials as do other
parties.
TAMMY Jo BERGE
